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This analysis tests the price discovery relationship between sovereign CDS premia and bond yield
spreads on the same reference entity. The theoretical no-arbitrage relationship between the two credit
spreads is confronted with daily data from six Euro-area countries over the period 2004-2011. As a
first step, the supposed non stationarity of the two series is verified. Then, we examine whether the
non-stationary CDS and bond spreads series are bound by a cointegration relationship. Overall the
cointegration analysis confirms that the two prices should be equal to each other in equilibrium, as
theory predicts. Nonetheless the theoretical value [1, -1] for the cointegrating vector is rejected, meaning
that in the short run the cash and synthetic market's valuation of credit risk differ to various degrees.
The VECM analysis suggests that the CDS market moves ahead of the bond market in terms of price
discovery. These findings are further supported by the Granger Causality Test: for most sovereigns
in the sample, past values of CDS spreads help to forecast bond yield spreads. Short-run deviations
from the equilibrium persist longer than it would take for participants in one market to observe the
price in the other. That is consistent with the hypothesis of imperfections in the arbitrage relationship













As Duﬃe (1999) and related literature point out, a theoretical no-arbitrage condition between the
cash and synthetic price of credit risk should drive investment decisions and tie up the two credit
spreads in the long run. Insofar as credit risk is what they price, cash and synthetic market prices
should reﬂect an equal valuation, in equilibrium. If in the short run they are aﬀected by factors
other than credit risk, such elements may partially obscure the comovement between bond yield
spreads and CDS premia.
The ﬁrst contribution of this study lies in checking the accuracy of credit risk pricing in the CDS
market by comparing the theoretically implied CDS premia with the one established by the market.
The existence of a stable cointegration relationship between the two credit spreads presupposes a
statistically signiﬁcant long-run connection between bonds and CDS contracts on the same reference
entity. On the one hand, this rules out the possibility that credit risk is priced in unrelated ways in
the derivative and cash market. On the other, we cannot discard the hypothesis that large common
pricing components rather than credit risk aﬀect both prices to some extent.
As a second contribution, we address the relative eﬃciency of credit risk pricing in the bond and
CDS market. In order to explore the price discovery relationship between CDS and bond yield
spreads, we estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). We proceed in three steps: ﬁrst,
we apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for each bond yield spread and CDS premia series. If the
credit spreads are cointegrated of order one at the 5% level, for each country in the sample we then
perform a Johansen cointegration test to determine if bond yield spreads and CDS premia move
together in the long run. If the cointegration hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level, we then
estimate a Vector Error Correction Model to investigate whether the CDS market can anticipate
the bond market in pricing, or merely adapts to the cash market valuation of credit risk.
Several recent papers study the credit derivative markets. The majority focus on CDS contracts
written on corporate bonds,1 and their data do not cover the past several years, in which the CDS
market grew rapidly and then went through the ﬁnancial crisis. Of the few papers devoted to the
1J. Hull, M. Predescu, and A. White, 2004; R. Blanco, S. Brennan, and I.W. Marsh, 2005. Blanco et al. do take
an approach similar to our own, unlike the studies cited in fn. 2.
2study of sovereign CDS spreads, most focus on emerging markets. We know of only two papers on
sovereign credit risk in the European Union based on CDS market data.2 The size of the markets,
the intrinsic interest of the recent period, and the policy relevance of CDS market performance
would seem to justify further work with a diﬀerent approach.
The most relevant studies following the accuracy and eﬃciency dimensions of credit risk are Zhu
(2006) and Ammer and Cai (2011). Zhu examines how CDS spreads interact with bond rates,
using daily data of corporate names over the period 1999-2002. His analysis conﬁrms that the
long-run parity condition holds in the data for corporate reference entities, even though short-run
price discrepancies can exist between the two markets. VECM analysis shows that the derivative
market moves ahead of the bond market in terms of price discovery. Ammer and Cai (2011) ﬁnd
that the parity relationship between the two credit spreads holds for a sample of nine emerging
market economies over the period 2001-2005. They provide no conclusive evidence regarding which
market leads price discovery, but they argue that the relatively more liquid market tends to lead.3
Our study similarly brings the theoretical parity relation between CDS and bond spreads to the
data, but it diﬀers from their papers in several ways. First, we cover a substantially longer and
more recent period than does Zhu (2004-2010 vs. 1999-2002). We include in the analysis the period
of maturity of CDS market,4 and we extend the analysis over the current ﬁnancial crisis. Although
the theoretical framework we refer to is similar to that of Zhu (2006), we examine the Eurozone
2O. Arce et al., 2011. Their country sample and approach diﬀer from ours. They apply a statistical arbitrage test
(Hogan, Teo, and Warachka, 2004) on the CDS-bond basis trying to assess whether the existence of a non-zero basis
has either to be seen as a consequence of market frictions or has to be understood as an opportunity for arbitrage.
In their price discovery analysis, they use rolling windows estimation, while we apply a static price discovery metric.
Our results are not directly comparable.
A. Fontana and M. Scheicher, 2010. They focus on ten EU countries over the period 2006-2010. They do regression
analysis to investigate the determinants of the sovereign CDS-bond basis. This is a rather diﬀerent perspective. In
addition, they apply VECM framework to 10 year bond and CDS series to investigate their price discovery relation.
They split their sample into pre and post crisis, hence producing results not directly comparable to ours, as we
decided not to break up the sample period (see discussion below).
3Ammer and Cai show that the Gonzalo and Granger measure of CDS price leadership is positively correlated with
the ratio of the bond bid-ask spread, to CDS bid-ask spread and negatively with the number of bonds outstanding,
respectively a proxy for relative and collective bond market liquidity. Arce, Mayordomo and Pena ﬁnd that price
discovery is state-dependent, and they argue that market liquidity is a signiﬁcant factor in determining which market
leads price discovery.
4According to the International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) Market Survey (2008), after 2003 the
CDS market reached its maturity, characterized by a rapid growth, and by the shift in its primary use from hedging
to speculation. The global notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding started to fall only after a series of large
scale incidents in 2008, beginning with the failure of Bear Stearns.
3credit risk, an issue largely ignored until spring 2010.
Compared to Ammer and Cai (2011), we also focus the analysis on sovereign debt, but we refer to
credit risk in developed economies. Our results seem to convey a more clear-cut picture of the role of
the CDS market in sovereign credit risk pricing. Our principal results are as follows. There is clear
evidence that CDS and bond yield spreads diverge substantially in the short run. VECM results
suggest that this may be attributed largely to a diﬀerent timing of response to new information
available in the short run. Nonetheless, cointegration analysis supports the long-run price accuracy
of CDS relative to the underlying bond market, suggesting long-run equilibrium between the two
credit prices.
In the baseline VECM estimation with two lags, four out of six countries in the sample show the
existence of a signiﬁcant two-way price interaction between the CDS and the underlying bond
markets. For these countries, the CDS market reacts relatively more quickly to changes in credit
conditions. For the remaining two sovereigns in the sample, we observe a one-way credit risk pricing
dynamic where information is essentially revealed in the CDS market, and the cash market adjusts
to eliminate deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
Short-term deviations show surprising persistence. On average, only 2% of price discrepancies are
eliminated within two business days. This suggests that there may be some rigidities at play in one
or both markets.
The approach and conclusions of our study are also similar to those in Blanco et al. (2005), even
though they focus on corporate credit risk and include also US reference entities in their study. An
important diﬀerence with their paper is that they focus on data from 2001-2002, before the real
boom of the European CDS market starting in 2003, while we rely on a much longer time span,
including the ﬁnancial crisis.
Section 2 provides a market overview and introduces the theoretical pricing framework. Section 3
describes the econometric methodology and summarizes the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
42 The CDS Market
2.1 Pricing Framework and Related Literature
This study relates to a speciﬁc branch of the literature on credit risk pricing based on the approx-
imate arbitrage relationship between CDS prices and credit spreads for a given reference entity.
According to Duﬃe (1999), elaborated by Hull and White (2003), there is a perfect arbitrage op-
portunity between a risky bond traded at par, a riskless par bond, and a CDS contract of the
corresponding maturity. Under certain assumptions, the price of a CDS contract can always be
deduced from the asset swap spread of a bond. Speciﬁcally, one needs to assume no frictions to
short-selling the risky bond in the repo market, and that the recovery rate of a defaulted bond is
zero. A rigorous theoretical measure of CDS spreads would require an estimate of the risk-neutral
probability that the underlying bond defaults at diﬀerent future times and an estimate of the re-
covery rate in case of default. Making use of this loose proximate arbitrage relation instead allows
us to provide an approximate upper bound to the true CDS spread. Given the assumption of zero
recovery rate in case of default, our estimate of the true spread is always biased upwards. Following
the same logic, our estimates of the yield to matury on the bond can be seen as a lower bound to
the true one, as we are not taking into account the cost associated to shorting the risky asset.
Under these assumptions, the annual yield of a risk-free bond must be equal, in equilibrium, to the
diﬀerence between the annual yield of the corresponding risky bond and the cost of credit protection
expressed as a percentage of the risky bond nominal value.5 If the annual premium paid in the
CDS market for credit protection is CDSspread and the annual yield of the risky and risk-free bond
are respectively BY and BYrf, then:
BYrf = BY − CDSspread (1)
Whenever BYrf > BY − CDSspread investors would make a proﬁt buying the risk-free product,
shorting the risky bond and selling protection in the CDS market. If BYrf < BY − CDSspread,
then buying a risky bond, buying protection on it in the CDS market and shorting the risk-free
5Duﬃe originally used LIBOR as the risk free rate, whereas Hull and White used US Treasuries as the riskless
benchmark.
5bond would be proﬁtable.
The same condition can be expressed in terms of the basis. The bond-CDS basis is the diﬀerence
between the CDS spread and the bond yield spread on the same reference entity, deﬁned as the
spread of a risky bond over a risk-free bond of the same maturity. Based on the previous relation,
and assuming perfect arbitrage between the cash and synthetic market, the basis should equal zero
in equilibrium:
BASIS = CDSspread − (BY − BYrf) = 0 (2)
For this theoretical arbitrage relation to hold, each parameter of the two bonds must be identical,
and we must disregard the counterparty risk associated with CDS contracts, i.e., the possibility
that the protection seller might be unable to make payment in case of default event.
The intrinsic diﬃculty of quantifying repo costs and counterparty risk would seem to justify the
choice of this simpliﬁed approach. This method is the most used by market practitioners to de-
termine theoretical prices. It is often referred to as the “No Arbitrage” approach. Another con-
sideration is that several non-fundamental factors seem to have an impact on CDS prices, among
which liquidity premia, rating agencies outlooks and speculative predatory behaviour may play a
non trivial role. Providing an accurate representation of the true theoretical relationship betweeen
bond and CDS prices would require netting out the eﬀect of any large common factor that aﬀect
bond and CDS pricing. It seems to go beyond the scope of our study, which aims at describing
how new available pricing information is received in the two markets, regardless how noisy such
information is. The choice of our method seems consistent with our intended limited objective.
Duﬃe (1999) started a sequence of empirical work analyzing how well the theoretical relation
between bond yield spreads and CDS premia holds in practice. Most empirical research has focused
on CDS contracts written on corporate names. Longstaﬀ et al. (2003) and Zhu (2006) found
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between CDS premia and bond yield spreads and showed that the CDS
market often moves ahead of the bond market in price discovery. Both studies focus primarily on
the eﬀects of liquidity on basis spreads. This is their main contribution to the related literature, as
6the issue of liquidity in CDS pricing was hardly addressed in the period before the 2008 liquidity
crunch. Zhu (2006) ﬁnds that for CDS contracts written on corporate bonds price discrepancies
may exist in the short run, but the price equilibrium is recovered over the long horizon. Overall,
the CDS market seems to lead price discovery.
Blanco et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the theoretical arbitrage relationship between the two credit spreads is
mainly respected in the long run, and they also ﬁnd evidence of CDS leading in price discovery. They
base their analysis on investment-grade corporate names, however, leaving uncertainty regarding
whether the same conclusion could apply to speculative-grade investment names or sovereigns. Hull
et al. (2004) test the zero basis theoretical condition for a list of corporate names in the US market,
and ﬁnd strong support for the equilibrium hypothesis. By contrast, Houweling et al. (2001) claim
there is no price equilibrium between corporate CDS spreads and bond yield spreads. They argue
the average price diﬀerence is around 10 basis points. The contradictory results may reﬂect the
diﬀerent sample periods under analysis in these studies; the relationship between CDS and bond
yield spreads may change over time.
There has been relatively little work comparing the CDS and bond markets for sovereign debt. The
most relevant work in the ﬁeld of emerging market sovereign credit risk is Ammer and Cai (2011).
The authors test for nine emerging countries using a rich dataset from February 2001 to March
2005. The main point of their study is to emphasize the role of the “cheapest to deliver” option6
in aﬀecting CDS premia, driving the basis above zero. They ﬁnd that CDS premia and bond yield
spreads are linked by a stable linear long-run equilibrium relation. In the short run, they cannot
conclude which of the two markets leads price discovery, although they suggest that the most liquid
market tends to lead.
Another strand in the literature has focused on credit risk in the European Union, even though
evidence for European credit markets is so far limited. A number of studies have focused on
6Some CDS contracts provide investors with the right to deliver diﬀerent grades of the underlying asset. It happens
when the reference entity has more than one long-term debt instrument outstanding that matches the debt seniority
speciﬁed in the contract. This mechanism is known as the Cheapest to Deliver (CTD) option. It is considered to be
one of the concurrent elements pushing CDS spreads above bond yield spreads in the short run. There can always be
an incentive to deliver the lowest-priced instrument that the protection buyer can convey, according to its contractual
clauses.
7government bond spreads in the EU,7 but, as far as we know, only Varga (2009) and Arce et al.
(2011) have tried confronting explicitly the theoretical parity condition between CDS and bond
market using Eurozone data.
2.2 Terms of a Typical CDS Contract
CDS are over the counter (OTC) ﬁnancial instruments that oﬀer investors a very high degree of
ﬂexibility. CDS contracts transfer the credit risk associated with corporate or sovereign bonds to
a third party, without shifting any other risks associated with such bonds or loans. According to
Trade Information Warehouse Reports on OTC Derivatives Market Activity, the outstanding gross
notional value of live positions of CDS contracts stands at 15 trillion USD (31 August 2011) across
2,156,591 trades.8
The theoretical use of a CDS contract is to provide insurance against unexpected losses due to a
default by a corporate or sovereign entity. The debt issuer is known as the reference entity, and a
default or restructuring on the predeﬁned debt contract is known as a credit event. In the most
general terms, it is a bilateral deal where a “protection buyer” pays a periodic ﬁxed premium,9
usually expressed in basis points of the reference asset’s nominal value, to a counterpart known
by convention as the “protection seller”. The total amount paid per year as a percentage of the
notional principal is known as the CDS spread. Most features of sovereign CDS are identical to
those of corporate ones, except that for sovereigns there may be fewer asymmetries of information
among market participants, as most relevant information about the health of the economy and
public ﬁnances is common knowledge. As a result, new publicly available information should be
immediately reﬂected in prices. If there are any diﬀerences in the timing of response between the
cash and synthetic market, it is the more liquid market that should lead price discovery.10 While
7L. Codogno, 2003; L. Pagano and E.L. Von Thadden, 2004; C. Favero et F. Giavazzi, 2008; A. Beber et al., 2009.
8The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) announced in October 2008 its intention to
turn public the information regarding the notional amounts of CDS transactions registered in its Trade
Information Warehouse. Weekly updated free of charge data streams are now available to the public:
www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php.
9Usually paid quarterly in arrears.
10For an overview on the role of liquidity in sovereign CDS pricing see Ammer and Cai , 2011.
8CDS contracts written on sovereign names accounted for half the size of the CDS market in 1997, in
the early 2000s this ratio declined to 7 per cent.11 The market share of sovereign CDS dropped to
5 per cent at the end of 2007, with contracts written on emerging economies accounting for over 90
per cent of the global volume of trade.12 Since the Eurozone debt crisis began, however, the share
of sovereign CDS has risen sharply. At the end of May 2010, the gross notional value of the whole
CDS market accounted for 14.5 trillion USD, with about 2.1 million contracts outstanding. The
sovereign segment of the market reached 2.2 trillion USD, with 0.2 million contracts.13 Hedge funds,
global investment banks and non-resident fund managers seem to be the most active participants
in the market.14
Before the introduction of credit derivatives, there was no way to isolate credit risk from the
underlying bond or loan, and there was no such concept as “credit basis”, which is, by deﬁnition, the
diﬀerence between the return on a cash asset and the synthetic form of the same asset. While theory
predicts that cash and derivative market price of the same asset should be the same, diﬀerences in
asset quality and a number of other technical factors imply that a non-zero basis is normal. Thus the
credit basis is used to search for arbitrage opportunity. Basis trades involve holding a simultaneous
position on the same asset both in the cash and the derivative market. Such an investment strategy
aims at exploiting any short term price diﬀerences between the cash and synthetic markets to make
risk-free proﬁts. Prior to the expiration of the derivative contract, the basis can be positive or
negative. In the simple case of a ﬁxed-coupon bond hedged via CDS, when the cash market price
increases by more than the derivative price, the basis increases. Therefore, the basis turns positive
when the risk premium on the risky bond is “too low” or the CDS spread is “too high”. A positive
basis can be adjusted back to zero by short selling the risky bond, but this could take some time
due to the rigidities in the cash market, implying that the basis could remain positive persistently.
On the other hand, the CDS-bond basis decreases when the derivative market price increases by
more than the spot price. The basis turns negative when the credit risk premium on a risky bond
is higher than its theoretical value, or the CDS spread is too low. In this latter case, arbitrage is
11F. Packer and C. Suthiphongchai, 2003.
12BIS (2007).
13Source: DTCC.
14Report on Sovereign CDS (2010) http://ft.com/CDSreport.
9easier to conduct: a negative basis can be adjusted back to zero faster by short-selling the risk-free
bond.
Rather than hedging, a CDS contract can be used for speculative purposes by an investor who does
not own any debt to hedge.15 He buys a “naked” CDS.16 This investor speculates on a deterioration
of the creditworthiness of the reference entity, as he can then sell the CDS contracts written on
the reference asset at a proﬁt. In terms of risk proﬁle, a naked CDS holder makes a proﬁt only if
a credit event occurs. His position in the credit market is similar to short selling a bond, taking
a short position in credit risk. From 2002 onwards, naked CDS have become increasingly used for
trading both sovereign and corporate risks.
2.3 Basis Trends and Basis Drivers
The existence of a long run parity relationship between bond yield spreads and CDS spreads is
a testable hypothesis. For the theoretical no-arbitrage condition to hold, either the basis should
cluster around zero in the data, or it should converge to zero in a longer time horizon.
Figure 1.
Average 5-year CDS-Bond basis 
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Sources: CMA and authors’ calculation
15For instance when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, it had approximately 155 billion USD of outstanding debt,
but twice as much notional value of CDS contracts written on its debt, meaning that many investors had entered
CDS contracts for speculative reasons.
16R. Portes, 2010.
10Figure 2 showing the time series of the basis over 2004-2011 is presented in appendix. Market
observation suggests that the annual average basis clustered around zero for the period 2004-2007.
Since the second half of 2007 it started to ﬂuctuate. The average basis became positive for all the
six sovereigns over the period 2008-2009, with the country means ranging from 4 to 40 basis points.
After 2008, an average positive basis seems to be the norm in the market, even taking into account
the large negative basis spread ﬂuctuations that Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have shown since
the second half of 2010. Over the whole sample period, the average basis has remained positive
for ﬁve out of six countries in the sample, with the sole exception of Greece; the country means
range from 9 to 21 basis points. Basis spreads are small for the most part of the sample period,
but persistent.
A positive basis seems to be the norm in developing economies; this may reﬂect an elevated or
volatile fear that governments will default. We might ask why a non zero basis exists in the EU
area, and how changes in the credit spreads should be interpreted knowing that the basis is the
variable that ties up the cash and synthetic credit market, in the long run.
The size of the CDS-bond basis provides a rough measure of the gain arising from arbitrage oppor-
tunities that can result from pricing ineﬃciencies in the credit market. It is important to notice
that the logic behind basis trading is that investors actually expect the basis to ﬂuctuate signif-
icantly away from zero. For example, if the basis is positive, the standard arbitrage trade is to
sell the basis, which means sell the cash bond and sell protection on it on the CDS market. The
gain arises from the fact that if the credit quality of the reference entity improves (and the basis
gets narrow) no protection “payment” will be executed, while the protection seller proﬁts from the
ﬂow of CDS premia payments. No signiﬁcant arbitrage proﬁt can be gained if the basis remains
stable or ﬂuctuates close to zero. On the other side, if the basis is negative, the potential arbitrage
trade is to buy the basis, which means to buy the cash bond and buy protection on it on the CDS
market. Again, the proﬁtability of the trade is linked to worsening in the credit quality of the
reference entity. Upon default, the protection buyer gets compensation from the protection seller.
If no credit event occurs, he can still resell the protection on the reference asset at a higher rate, as
the reference entity is now considered riskier. It is possible that once a non-zero basis is established
11in the market, the dynamics of basis trades may contribute to keep it away from its theoretical
value. Strong market demand from protection buyers will drive the basis upwards, while strong
market supply from protection sellers will drive the basis down.
The size and direction of the basis spread appear to be inﬂuenced by a mix of technical and market
factors whose impact varies with market conditions. Hull et al. (2004) as well as Blanco et al.
(2005) discuss several factors that might interfere in the arbitrage relation between CDS and bond
spreads and lead to a non- zero basis in the short run. Among the factors that can drive the basis
positive we cite the following:
(i) CDS premia are always positive. They correspond to ﬁxed payments to the protection seller,
and even for highly rated bonds whose market view of credit risk is very low, a protection seller
writing protection on such a bond still expects a positive premium for selling protection on the
asset. This may positively bias the basis measure.
(ii) The Cheapest to Deliver (CTD) option embodied in many physically settled CDS contracts
may aﬀect the basis, although the impact of this factor might be small for sovereign CDS, because
they are more frequently settled in cash.
(iii) In certain cases, the accrued coupon on the reference bond is also delivered to the protection
buyer in case of default; nevertheless, this is not the norm. The positive bias deriving from this
factor is likely to be small.
(iv) If the reference bond of a CDS contract is trading below par, in case of default the protection
seller will experience a greater loss compared to an investor who holds the asset in the cash form.
This is because upon default the protection seller will have to pay out the par value minus the asset
price at the time of default. This might bias the basis spread upwards.
(v) For illiquid segments of the CDS market, protection sellers may charge a premium which drives
the basis upwards. Protection sellers may in fact be seen as liquidity providers to the market in
times of ﬁnancial distress, when reference entities may default on their debt.
Among the factors that may lead to a negative basis, we have:
(i) Counterparty risk: the protection buyer takes on the risk that the protection seller will not be
able to fulﬁll his commitment to deliver a compensation payment in case a credit event occurs. The
12protection seller is also exposed to counterparty risk, but if the buyer defaults, the CDS contract
is terminated, leaving the size of this risk negligible for the seller.17
(ii) There may be a liquidity premium in either the bond or the CDS market, and if the market
for the risky bond is (plausibly) less liquid than the market for risk-free bonds, this might increase
bond yield spreads, driving the basis negative.18
All factors that aﬀect more the risk proﬁle of the CDS contract tend to increase the basis, while
factors that appear to aﬀect more the creditworthiness of the bond relative to the CDS will drive
the basis down. Any factor that may increase the return of the bond relative to the CDS contract




All bond yields and CDS spreads series used in this study are collected from CMA, one of the
leading sources of credit market data. The sample period runs from 30 January 2004 through 11
March 2011. The time span covered by the regression analysis is equal for each country, at the price
of using fewer observations. We restricted our analysis to six countries for which daily estimates
of 5-year government bond yields are available on DataStream market curve analysis, to make sure
that market data are reasonably comparable. Stored government bond yield curves were available
for 9 EU countries. Among those, CDS quotes for Spain were available for only 1556 days, instead
of 1879 as for the rest of the sample. Therefore, Spain has been excluded from the analysis.19 The
countries in our resulting sample are Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Due
to the heterogeneity in the debt characteristics across the six reference entities, we conduct each
step of the analysis separately on each country without grouping them for credit class.
17Arora et al. (2011) show that the eﬀect of counterparty risk on CDS spreads is small.
18Bongaerts et al. (2011) ﬁnd such eﬀects in CDS spreads.
19Arce, Mayordomo, and Pena include Spain nevertheless.
13CMA provides information on mid-quotes and bid-ask prices for diﬀerent maturity sovereign CDS
series. Due to the very limited coverage in CDS market before 2003, sovereign CDS data before
2004 show signiﬁcant inconsistencies. It is common to ﬁnd in DataStream “pegged” values for 2003
CDS premia for a signiﬁcant number of consecutive days. Missing information might be due to
late development of an active CDS market for some countries, or initial scarce market liquidity, or
may simply depend on when CMA started to collect data for that particular country. As it was
impossible to distinguish between missing information and eﬀective “price runs”, linked to scarce
liquidity, data from 2003 have been excluded from the analysis. Inconsistency of the premia across
the diﬀerent maturities was used to ﬁlter the available time series. CDS quotes from 1 to 5 year
and 10 year maturity are generally available for all EU countries. To avoid the problem of “pegged”
values, the 5-year CDS spread series has been chosen. The 5-year maturity seems to be the most
liquid maturity segment in the sovereign CDS market, the most actively traded, as conﬁrmed by
market practitioners.
All the sovereign CDS premia are averages across diﬀerent CDS dealers. CMA partner agencies
collect daily quote information and then average them to provide a single daily average quote.
Therefore, CDS premia are constructed out of aggregate data. They do not reﬂect any actual
transaction costs, but rather compound information on various transactions quotes by several bro-
kers, reﬂecting the total market response for each trading day. During the selected time span, 5-year
CDS mid quotes are available on a daily basis for all the six chosen reference entities.
DataStream stored yield curves are available for all the major bond markets since September 1990.
In order to determine the government bond yield spread for each country in the sample, we compare
the risky government bond yield for each country with its comparable risk-free benchmark across
the speciﬁc 5-year maturity. Consistently with previous studies on sovereign credit spreads, for
the risk-free benchmark we refer to the market yield of euro-denominated German government
bonds.20 Ideally for each sovereign entity a constant maturity 5-year bond had to be matched to
the corresponding CDS for each of the observation days in the sample. In reality, the number of
outstanding bonds is rather limited. To overcome this problem we refer to the 5-year constant
20Although Dunne et al. (2008) show that this is in fact a contestable assumption.
14maturity government bond stored yield curve downloadable from the DataStream ﬁxed income
market curve analysis window. Such yield curves are constructed with an optimization model that
takes into account simultaneously all maturity points and best ﬁts the existing yields’ information.
The alternative procedure is to estimate a 5-year yield to maturity on a daily basis by linearly
interpolating the yields of available bonds in the smallest possible horizon around the 5-year exact
maturity. Bond yield estimates provided by DataStream appear to be more reliable in terms of
approximation and are much smoother than those constructed by linear interpolation.
3.2 Cointegration Analysis
To examine the long term consistency between CDS premia and bond yield spreads we proceed
in two steps. First, a cointegration check is performed. CDS rates and bond yield spreads for
which a cointegrated relationship holds can be used in the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
representation to test the relative price eﬃciency of the cash and derivative markets. An issue we
need to deal with in our dataset is the potential structural break introduced in our data by the
ﬁnancial crisis that began in autumn 2008. Perron (1989) was the ﬁrst to argue that stationary
models with structural breaks could easily be confused with unit root models. Unit root tests
that do not account for possible breaks in the series are known to have low power.21 There is no
consensus yet on the reliability of the results of standard unit root tests in presence of potential
multiple breaks in the data, and no general agreement on the best methodology to perform unit root
tests in such circumstances. Moreover, non-stationarity aﬀects the results of tests for a structural
break.22 Our sample period is longer than in most other referenced studies. We believe it is a value
added in its own: splitting the tests into a non-crisis and crisis period may lose the advantage of
lengthof our time series, reducing the power of tests. Our results seem stable. In addition, in view
of the length of our sample, formal testing for structural break would have to take into account a
lot of possible break points, such as the 2007 subprime crisis, the September 2008 banking crisis,
and the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
21A.W. Gregory et al., 1994.
22P. Perron, 2005.
15With these reservations, we perform the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on each
set of CDS and bond spreads trying to provide a parsimonious representation of the true data
generating processes. Table II reports the results of the unit root check. For each country, the null
hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected at the 5% percent level for both the CDS premium and
bond yield spread series.
The second step of the analysis examines whether the two credit spreads are cointegrated. Any
equilibrium theories that involve bond and CDS spreads require a combination of such variables to
be stationary; otherwise, any deviation from the equilibrium will not be temporary. On the other
hand, if CDS premia and bond yield spreads do not cointegrate, it implies that the two prices can,
in fact, move in unrelated ways over the long run, and credit risk pricing in the two markets may
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
For each country in the sample, we estimate the following cointegration equation:
CDSspreadt = α + βBY spreadt + εt (3)
Where εt = [CDSspreadt − α − βBY spreadt] is I(0).
The expression in square brackets is the cointegrating vector; it has normalized coeﬃcients [1, -a
- b]. Since theory predicts that the two credit spreads should be equal in equilibrium, a natural
candidate for the cointegration relationship is the [1, -1] cointegrating vector, with α = 0. But this
is just a theoretical possibility. If α is non zero and β = 1 in the cointegration equation, we still
cannot reject the hypothesis that the cash and synthetic market price the credit risk equally. The
two markets are probably closely related, but price discrepancies between bond and CDS rates may
arise and remain persistently.
If CDS and bond spreads do cointegrate, but the cointegrating vector is not the desired [1, -1],
the two credit spreads move together in the long run, but the two markets may price credit risk
diﬀerently in the short run. This might indicate that there are structural diﬀerences between the
two markets, such as signiﬁcant transaction costs that impede arbitrage or that the markets have
diﬀerent liquidity.
The Johansen Cointegration test allows testing for cointegration with unknown cointegrating vec-
16tors, estimating both the cointegrating vectors and determining the number of cointegrating re-
lationships. We deal with a system of two I(1) variables, so our results will show at most one
cointegrating relationship. Performing the standard Johansen test without assuming any structural
breaks may cause the over-rejection of the cointegration hypothesis. Structural breaks in the series
can make the cointegrationg vector trend-stationary and inﬂuence the test statistics in favor of re-
jecting the stationarity of the cointegrationg vector.23 Table III and Table IV show trace statistics
and p-values of Johansen test from two-equation system in CDS premia and bond yield spreads for
each country in the sample. The hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% level over the
whole sample. Overall it suggests that a long run linear relationship exists between CDS premia
and bond yields spreads for each of the six countries in the sample.
Table IV shows that the value of the cointegration parameter diﬀers from 1 across all sampled
countries. The diﬀerence is small but signiﬁcant for all countries in the sample. The cointegration
results seem consistent with the overall picture showing non zero basis spreads over the whole
sample period. Bond and CDS markets price credit risk compatible with the long-run no arbitrage
equilibrium. But CDS premia and bond yield spreads may still permanently deviate from each
other, generating signiﬁcant arbitrage opportunities.
3.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
The non-zero basis that we observe in the data proves that not all the information relevant to the
valuation of credit risk is completely reﬂected in the short-run pricing dynamics in the cash and
derivative markets. This suggests a market ineﬃciency, leading us to ask which market reacts more
promptly to signals perceived as informative of the underlying sovereign entity’s credit standing. In
particular, it is not known whether credit risk is priced according to a two-way dynamic, where both
cash and synthetic market information content is valued; or whether, alternatively, price discovery
is always driven by one market, and the other merely adjusts, bringing no real contribution to
the equilibrium price assigned to sovereign default risk. When we ﬁnd evidence of both markets
23J. Attﬁeld, 2003.
17contributing to price discovery, we try to assess the relative speed of adjustment of the two credit
spreads. Alternatively, we observe a one-way price discovery process where all perceived information
regarding credit risk is ﬁrst revealed in one market. Since the leading market in price discovery
provides the most up to date information about the perceived level of credit risk, in this sense is
the more eﬃcient in its pricing. Prices in the more liquid market should be quicker to reﬂect public
information. However, such information can be characterized by a signiﬁcant transitory noise that
is ultimately incorporated in CDS spreads.
The VECM is a linear representation of the stochastic data generation process. Each of the variables
in the model is considered endogenous, comprising of two components: a linear function of the
past realizations of all variables in the system,24 and an unpredictable innovation component. In
the Error Correction setting, the changes in a variable are modeled depending on the deviation
from some equilibrium relation, whose form is described by the cointegrating vector. The Error
Correction term is in fact an expression in a and b that corresponds to the same parameters in the
Johansen Cointegration analysis.25 The Cointegration vector is itself an expression of the long-run
relationship between CDS and bond yield spreads in levels. The adjustment coeﬃcients estimate to
what extent the error is corrected each period, and therefore they provide a measure of the relative
speed of adjustment of bond and CDS markets towards the long run equilibrium.
The VEC representation of the model is:






δ1∆Byst−1 + ε1t (4)






δ2∆Byst−1 + ε2t (5)
where CDStand BY St stand for CDS spreads and bond yield spreads at time t, and ε1tand ε2t are
i.i.d. shocks. The ﬁrst term is the error correction mechanism through which the sovereign credit
spreads evolves in the bond and CDS markets to adjust in the long run. It can be seen as the
“error” from the long term equilibrium relation.
24Including a variable’s own lagged values.
25When a=0 and b=1, the ﬁrst term in the model becomes the ﬁrst lag of the basis spread.
18According to our model speciﬁcation, [-,+] are the expected set of signs for the adjustment coeﬃ-
cients λ1 and λ2 which imply that both credit spreads contribute to the error correction mechanism.
If both the estimated adjustment coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, we can infer that there is
a signiﬁcant price interaction between the bond and CDS market.
If one market always lags the other, then the coeﬃcient in the equation for the market that always
leads price discovery should be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. If λ1 is negative and signiﬁcant,
it means that the CDS market adjusts to remove pricing errors, meaning that the bond market prices
credit risk ﬁrst. If λ2 is signiﬁcant and positive, it means that the cash market adjusts, and the
CDS market is quicker in reﬂecting changes in the credit conditions of the underlying reference
entities. If both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and with the proper sign, the relative magnitude of the
adjustment coeﬃcients determines the relative importance of each market in price discovery. The
more “reactive” market is the more eﬃcient in terms of credit risk pricing.
Table V shows our VECM results. For Austria, Belgium, Greece and Italy, the price discovery turns
out to be a two-way pattern, overall directed by the derivative market. Both adjustment coeﬃcients
show statistically signiﬁcant estimates, with the required set of signs. The λ1 coeﬃcient estimate is
not statistically signiﬁcant for Ireland and Portugal, meaning that for these countries credit risk is
priced in the CDS market ﬁrst, and the underlying bond market adjusts. Overall, there is evidence
that the CDS market tends to lead the bond market in price discovery.
The VECM regression is estimated allowing parameters a and b to be freely determined within the
model. For all the six sovereign names in the sample, the estimate of b is slightly but signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 1: it ranges from 0.8 to 1.89, consistent with the presence of short term pricing
discrepancies. These deviations exhibit considerable persistence: on average only around 2% of
price discrepancies is eliminated within two business days.
Following Ammer and Cai (2011), we refer to λ2
λ2−λ1, the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure,
to assess the relative contribution of each market to price discovery. It corresponds to the ratio
of the speeds of adjustment of the two markets. According to the way we speciﬁed the Error
Correction Representation of the model, when the Gonzalo and Granger measure is close to 1, it
means that the CDS market leads the price discovery, and the bond market follows to correct for
19pricing discrepancies. When it is close to 50%, both markets contribute approximately equally to
price discovery. When it is close to 0, the bond market leads the derivative market. The average
ratio of 0.61 over the sovereigns for which we discovered a two-way price relationship suggests that
the CDS market leads somewhat more than it adjusts.26 It is important to stress that the present
analysis is conducted over the most liquid part of the CDS curve, i.e. the 5-year segment. When
the desired liquidity requirements are matched, the CDS market tends to be more eﬃcient than its
cash counterpart in pricing credit risk.
3.4 Granger Causality Test
In order to get stronger evidence of which market leads price discovery, we also perform a pairwise
Granger Causality test over each set of CDS premia and bond yield spreads in the sample. Note,
however, that Granger causality testing results may be greatly aﬀected by the non-normality of the
underlying residuals.
The Granger hypothesis is used to infer whether the cash market helps to predict the pricing of
credit risk in the derivative market, or the relation between the two credit spreads goes the other
way round. Granger causality does not imply true causality. If CDS spreads Granger-cause bond
yield spreads, then past values of CDS premia should contain information that helps predict bond
spreads beyond the information contained in past values of bond yield spreads alone.
There are several ways to test for Granger causality. Here, we consider the simplest case of bivariate
Granger causality.27 Formally it means estimating the following regression:
Cdst = c1 + α1Cdst−1 + αt−pCdst−p + β1Byst−1 + ... + βt−pByst−p + ut (6)
for a particular lag length p, that can be estimated by OLS. Then conduct an F-test on the null
Hypothesis: H0: = β1 = ... =βp = 0. If the statistic exceeds the 5% critical value, the null
26But the estimated standard error of the ratio is 0.22, so that it is not in fact signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.5. We
do take the 0.61 value as suggestive, however.
27The test results are more valuable when the two markets under analysis do not show a two-way relationship, as
they do for four of our six countries. The Granger Causality test results must then be interpreted with additional
care, and they need to be confronted with the VECM analysis.
20hypothesis of absence of Granger Causality is rejected.
Table VI shows the Granger-Causality test results over a two-day horizon. For Greece, Ireland,
and Italy, past values of CDS spreads help predict the price of credit risk in the bond market. For
Belgium and Portugal the test shows Granger-causality working through both directions; nonethe-
less, we can reject the null hypothesis of CDS spread not Granger causal for bond yield spreads
with a higher level of signiﬁcance, meaning that the CDS role in forecasting bond yield spreads
seems conﬁrmed. The Granger causality test for Austria shows a one way Granger-causality driven
by bond yield spreads. This contradicting result may be an indication that the Granger causality
modeling is particularly sensitive to the non normality of the underlying distribution, leading at
times to inconsistent results.
Conclusion
The rapid expansion of the CDS market over the last decade represents one of the most interesting
recent developments in ﬁnancial markets. Its fast growth in volume, as well as its role in the current
ﬁnancial crisis,28 indicate the importance of studying this ﬁnancial product.
Since both CDS and bond contracts on the same reference entity oﬀer compensation for the same
credit risk, their price should be equal in equilibrium. To explore their long term relationship, as a
ﬁrst step, the supposed non stationary of the two series is veriﬁed. In order to test for a unit root we
refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: for each country in the sample, the null hypothesis of a
unit root in the CDS and bond yield spread series is not rejected at the 5% level. In a second step,
we verify whether the non stationary CDS and bond spreads series are bound by a cointegration
relationship. For all countries in the sample, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between CDS
premia and bond yield spreads is rejected at the 5% level. Overall the cointegration analysis conﬁrms
that the two prices should be equal to each other in long-run equilibrium, as theory predicts. One
interpretation is that the derivative market prices credit risk correctly: sovereign CDS contracts
written on Euro area borrowers seem to be able to provide new up to date information to sovereign
28M. Brunnermeier et al., 2009.
21cash market during the period 2004- 2011. The theoretical value [1, -1] for the cointegrating vector
is overall rejected, however, meaning that in the short run the cash and synthetic markets price
credit risk diﬀerently to various degrees. Note also that even if the CDS market prices credit risk
“correctly” in the long run, that does not mean that credit risk as priced by either the CDS or the
cash market reﬂects “fundamentals”.
The VECM analysis suggests that, in general, the derivative market moves ahead of the bond
market in price discovery. This goes in line with the results of Zhu (2006), but contrasts with
Ammer and Cai (2011), suggesting that the dynamics for developing and developed economies may
be very diﬀerent as far as sovereign credit risk is concerned. According to our ﬁndings, Eurozone
sovereign risk seems to behave closer to developed countries’ corporate credit risk than to developing
economies’ sovereign risk. The credit structure in the euro zone is certainly diﬀerent from that of
developing countries studied by Ammer and Cai, especially in terms of overall liquidity, and may
justify the diﬀerence between our results and theirs. Our results are in line with Varga (2009),
who ﬁnds that Hungarian bond and CDS markets are in a close relationship, even though in the
case of Hungary short term price discrepancies seem to be less persistent, and the CDS-bond basis
ﬂuctuates around zero for the most part of the period under analysis.
The VECM estimation provides information about the dynamics of adjustment to the long term
equilibrium between sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads. Deviations from the estimated long-
run equilibrium persist longer than if market participants in one market could immediately observe
the price in the other, consistent with the hypothesis of imperfections in the arbitrage relationship
between the two markets. Following Gonzalo and Granger (1995), we construct a measure that
reﬂects the relative contribution of each market to price discovery. Our estimate of an average 61%
for this measure over the whole sample suggests that the CDS market plays a leadership role in
the Eurozone countries we study, where the derivative market for sovereign debt is overall rather
liquid. As a whole, Granger Causality Test results do not seem to contradict the ﬁndings of the
VECM analysis, but they suggest a less clear-cut strong impact of past CDS information on bond
yield spreads.
Due to its liquid nature, the euro area CDS market seems to move ahead of the corresponding
22bond market in price adjustment, both before and during the crisis. There is an alternative causal
interpretation of our results. The CDS market may lead in price discovery because changes in
CDS prices aﬀect the fundamentals driving the prices of the underlying bonds. If the CDS spread
aﬀects the cost of funding of the sovereign (or corporate), then a rise in the spread will not merely
signal but will cause a deterioration in credit quality, hence a fall in the bond price (see Portes,
2010). Moreover, the change in spread may not signal at all: various non-fundamental determinants
can aﬀect the spreads (as in Tang and Yan, 2010) and therefore the fundamentals of the reference
entity. To confront this hypothesis with the data will require a dynamic model admitting multiple
equilibria. Research along these lines is just beginning (e.g., Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2011).
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Descriptive statistics of ﬁve-year CDS-Bond Basis
For each country in the sample, with the only exception of Greece, the average bond-CDS basis
spread remains positive over the sample period. The maximum and minimum values show that
between 2007 and 2010 all countries experienced both positive and negative peaks. The second
column shows the average absolute basis spread. This measure does not take into account the
alternation between positive and negative basis, thus providing a more straightforward measure of
the distance between CDS and bond market valuation of credit risk in each country.
Average Basis Absolute Basis Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
Austria 16.42 18.60 -21.98 171.06 26.34
Belgium 13.37 15.25 -26.46 142.46 23.60
Greece -26.78 36.45 -573.69 161.35 80.76
Ireland 21.62 40.51 -229.97 195.99 56.65
Italy 18.92 20.83 -29.69 126.88 27.12
Portugal 9.89 16.17 -246.32 174.92 31.92
Source: CMA, Thomson DataStream, own calculations.
29Table II
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
The ADF test indicates the presence of a unit root at the 0.05 level for all the ﬁve-year CDS and
bond yield spread series. The ﬁrst and third columns present the t-Statistics for the null hypothesis
of a unit root. The second and fourth columns show MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1996) one sided
p-values.
Null Hp. Null Hp.
BYS series has a unit root CDS spread series has a unit root
t-Statistic P Value t-Statistic P Value
Austria -1.94 0.3150 -1.85 0.3537
Belgium -1.74 0.4097 -0.36 0.9125
Greece 1.50 0.9993 1.11 0.9976
Ireland 0.47 0.9856 1.01 0.9967
Italy -1.45 0.5567 -1.13 0.7075
Portugal 2.92 1.0000 1.64 0.9996
30Table III
Johansen Cointegration Trace Test
The ﬁrst columns for each null hypothesis tested present Johansen Trace test statistics for the ﬁve-
year bond yield spreads and CDS premia for each country in the sample. The number of lags in
the underlying vector autoregression estimation is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). We found a signiﬁcant cointegration relationship over the whole sample period for all the
six sovereigns under analysis.
Null Hp. Null Hp.
Zero coint. vector P Value At most 1coint. vector P Value
Austria 86.97* 0.0000 2.57 0.1088
Belgium 21.55* 0.0054 0.05 0.8280
Greece 52.56* 0.0000 3.84 0.0508
Ireland 31.63* 0.0001 1.04 0.3080
Italy 36.01* 0.0000 0.81 0.3683
Portugal 19.57* 0.0115 2.75 0.0974
The Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level.
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-value.
31Table IV
Estimated Cointegration Coeﬃcients from Johansen Procedure
The ﬁrst column displays test statistics for restrictions on parameter β of the cointegration vector.
For all the six countries in the sample, the theoretical value β = 1 is rejected. Its value ranges from
0.78 to 1.66. The cointegration parameter β exceeds 1 for Austria, Belgium, and Italy meaning
that, over the long run, a 1bps change in the CDS spread is accompanied by a larger change in the
bond yield spread over the same reference entity. This implies that the bond market seems to be
the most volatile for these countries, while the opposite applies for Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
Null Hp: b=1







* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-value.
32TableV
VECM Estimates. Two Lags Model
The table shows the estimated values of the adjustment parameters of the two lags VECM estimated
for each country in the sample. For Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Italy the parameters λ1 and λ2
are both signiﬁcant meaning that both markets contributed to the price discovery of these sovereign
credit spreads. In contrast, for Ireland and Portugal the adjustment parameter λ1 is not signiﬁcant
meaning that it was primarily the sovereign CDS market where the price discovery of the credit
spread took place. The correspondent bond yield spreads merely followed the change of the CDS
spreads.
The last columns show the Gonzalo and Granger measure. It corresponds to the ratio of the speed
adjustment in the two markets. When the Gonzalo and Granger measure is close to 1, it means
that the CDS market plays a leading role in price discovery, and the bond market moves afterwards
to correct for pricing discrepancies. When the measure is close to 50%, both markets contribute
approximately equally to price discovery. When it is close to 0, the bond market leads the derivative
market. For all the countries in the sample except for Greece the measure exceedes 50%, meaning
that the CDS market leads price discovery more often than it adapts to the bond market valuation
of credit risk.
N° of Obs. b in Coint. Vector λ1 λ2
λ2
λ2−λ1
Austria 1879 -1.98 -0.01 0.06 0.86
(0.06135) (0.00485) (0.00631)
[-32.35] [-2.45] [9.39]
Belgium 1879 -1.61 -0.01 0.02 0.66
(0.10991) (0.0325) (0.00433)
[-14.67] [-2.12] [4.29]
Greece 1879 -0.80 -0.05 0.02 0.28
(0.01396) (0.00887) (0.00653)
[-57.07] [-5.48] [2.86]
Ireland 1879 -0.92 -0.01* 0.05 0.83*
(0.05249) (0.00339) (0.00898)
[-17.55] [-0.28] [6.08]
Italy 1879 -1.51 -0.01 0.02 0.66
(0.05938) (0.00568) (0.00489)
[-25.41] [-2.05] [4.80]
Portugal 1879 -0.84 -0.01* 0.02 0.66*
(0.0772) (0.00498) (0.00555)
[-20.73] [-0.62] [3.12]
* indicates non signiﬁcant parameters at the 5% level.
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Granger Causality Test
For each null hypothesis, the ﬁrst columns present the Chi-square statistics respectively for the
bond yield spreads and CDS premia for each country in the sample. The null hypothesis that bond
yield spread does not Granger-cause CDS spread is rejected at the 5% level for Austria, Belgium,
and Portugal. Belgium and Portugal show Granger causality directed in both directions meaning
that past values of bond yield spread variable do help forecast the actual level of CDS spreads,
as well as the opposite is true. At the same time, the null hypothesis that CDS spread does not
Granger-cause bond yield spread is rejected at the 5% level for all countries in the sample, except
for Austria. Overall, Granger causality results are not in contrast with VECM predictions, and
tend to conﬁrm that CDS spreads convey pricing information to the bond market. In the case of
Austria, the test results may be aﬀected by the non normality of the underlying distribution of
residuals, potentially leading to inconsistent results.
Null Hp: BYspread Null Hp: CDS spread
doesNOT ⇒CDS spread doesNOT ⇒BYspread
Chi-sq Prob. Chi-sq Prob.
Austria 9.02* 0.0110 1.46 0.4806
Belgium 13.49* 0.0012 48.90* 0.0000
Greece 0.03 0.9824 43.45* 0.0000
Ireland 1.63 0.4421 12.78* 0.0017
Italy 4.31 0.1160 88.25* 0.0000
Portugal 33.93* 0.0000 214.17* 0.0000
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